Philosophical theories of empiricism semantics and ontology

According to Carnap (1950), empiricists are generally suspicious of abstract entities of all kinds. Carnap further proceeds to explore the general view of Mathematical knowledge by the empiricists, positing that mathematics is not about numbers, functions and formulas but rather a manipulation of symbols that is depending on the rules laid out by the equations. In this context, I do not agree with this proposition. Mathematics is of great essence in real life if it as just a manipulation of symbols, then there would be no real-life application of these symbols but only in theory. The discussion on abstract entities mainly discusses the reality and unreal nature of various subjects such as physics and mathematics. This is the property-ness of “properties. ” Before delving the redness of something, then one has to first question the realness of possession of the color property.

I this aspect, I agree with Carnap. Some of the words to be used in the new framework under construction may already be in existence before the construction. Other variables that do not already exist are introduced during the construction as well as the introduction of new properties and rules. I tend to agree with most of the propositions by Carnap (1950). The construction of a linguistic framework is dependent on the acceptance of the ideologies surrounding the new idea. These could be new variables, properties and properties of properties as well as systems. The exploration of linguistic frameworks, therefore, should underpin the ontological compliance than the semantic meanings. This is because the external questions mean more than the internal questions within the framework.