Posted at 10.13.2018
The Oresund Fixed Link was a job initiated in 1991 by the Swedish and Danish governments and completed and opened in July 2000. The bridge, island and tunnel combination connects both metropolitan areas of the Oresund region, Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmo, Sweden. THE HYPERLINK involves the Oresund Bridge, a two-level (one for traffic, one for rail) pylon-supported structure, the Oresund Tunnel, a 4km-long tunnel, and the Peberholm Artificial Island which would transfer the traffic from the submerged tunnel to the bridge. It had been performed in a cooperative work between your Swedish and Danish government authorities whereby they might each form half the dog owner company (resundsbro Konsortiet) in 1992, which was in charge of financing, planning, making, building and eventually operating the hyperlink (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009).
We will try to display that the Oresund Fixed Link is one of the more successful mega-projects. has argued that mega-projects like the analogous Route Tunnel, Sydney Opera house or Millennium Dome are subject to cost and time overruns and quality shortfalls. The causes of those deficiencies include a politicization of the tendering and project proposal process, the legacy organic which can besiege governmental spending and the inefficient management of projects on a general public level. The knowledge of the Oresund Fixed Link, whilst not without short-comings, is regarded as being a job that in conditions of the QCD paradigm was satisfactorily maintained and far removed from the problematic tasks of its time. To the end, in May 2003, the Oresund Bridge won the International Association for Bridge and Structural Anatomist (IABSE) Outstanding Composition Award, knowing not only its design and construction but more importantly in our framework, its adherence to the suggested deliverables.
Identifying the necessity and opportunity:
The need for a link between Denmark and Sweden which crossed the Oresund audio had not been a novel one in 1991. In fact, the region have been the subject of territorial disputes between the nations dating back again to the 1600s and experienced fallen under ownership of both countries at various times (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009). Lack of political will and unpredictable economic conditions possessed prevented the Link from being properly canvassed before the late 1980s.
There were a variety of economical, infrastructural and political factors which created a dependence on a bridge between your two nations in the first 1990s. First of all, although Sweden was not member of the European Union (then EEC) in those days, its attention have been aimed to accession through the European recession of the past due 1980s (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009). Denmark acquired already acceded to the EEC in 1986. The increased focus on European integration intended that links, allowing the activity of goods and labour in particular would be required. Furthermore, Denmark within continental European countries, could become a gateway to Sweden and Finland in the north. Western european integration was thus a driving a vehicle factor behind the hyperlink and the actual benefits it could have in delivering the two nations and indeed Europe and Scandinavia closer together.
A more useful consideration in deciding the demand for the hyperlink was that of offering an alternative to the ferry-based transportation service that was set up at that time. The ferry service, with abnormal timetabling and being at the mercy of good climate, could be permitted to operate more successfully if there have been an alternative hyperlink which allowed both trade, leisure and commuter traffic(Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009).
The need for the link between Denmark and Sweden to increase efficiency and integration provided an possibility to create an individual Oresund metropolitan area. The conglomeration of both different Copenhagen and Malmo markets would allow for a typical property and labour market and increased commercial and educational opportunities. As Denmark and Sweden became more involved in the European process, and Europe became more built-in and markets more competitive, it was evident that the Oresund region could become a leading metropolis and hub if connected. The chance was also present for both countries as the Scandinavian banking crisis brought both nations into recessions and paved the way for stimulatory spending on infrastructure and other jobs.
Initial Risk Analysis:
An immediate risk during conception was posed by the financial conditions brought about by the Scandinavian banking problems (IMF, 2002). Although this provided a chance, the economic local climate in those days was far from certain and this uncertainty might have strong implications on financing rates of interest and resource and offer costs from overseas in the light of exchange rate fluctuations. The division of the stake in the consortium overseeing company between Swedish and Danish government authorities allowed the mitigation of risk by lowering cost of borrowing (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009).
Another evident risk experienced by the project initiators was that being a mega-project, handing over responsibility for design and structure to just one single company places strong burden on that company. To be able to mitigate this risk, the initiators segregated the job into three parts - the Tunnel, the Bridge and the unnatural island linking both - to be able to hopefully improve delay, cost and quality. Whilst this reduces the risk of default and hold off on the contract, it does present an additional risk of non-communication or worse still non-compliance between your separate components of the design.
The risk that the hyperlink would damage the surroundings was quite definitely in the awareness of the job initiators from the outset (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009). This can be because Denmark and Sweden are usually mixed up in conservation sphere, place emphasis on sustainable development and have the world's tightest adjustments on offshore building. Or maybe it's because of this of strong lobby-group pressure which brought up concerns regarding the potential environmental influences of the hyperlink (American University, 2005). Whichever it might be, the initiators committed, with some spurring on, to the creation of a project that was as much environmentally friendly as possible. The actual bad publicity and financial deficits from environmental destruction was something the initiators wanted to avoid.
There were few alternative approaches to the Oresund Hyperlink task, given the set in place parameters of subscribing to Sweden and Denmark and creating value (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009). The chance to link Malmo and Copenhagen metropolitan areas implied long-term, quantifiable value creation. One alternate might have been the Danish city Elsinore and Swedish Helsingborg, that happen to be deeper than Copenhagen and Malmo over the Sound, nevertheless the initiators believed that more gain would be derived by subscribing to two large metropolitan areas and supplying a interconnection near Copenhagen Air port to profit air travelers (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009). Alternatives to the 3-part task were also few. This is because the land under the Audio had not been even. As a result, it would not be possible to build a bridge which spanned the complete sound nor a tunnel without incurring extra cost.
Scope Management - Job Definition:
The project offered the following opportunities for the job initiators:
Create more robust trade and investment links between Denmark and Sweden as two nations
Create further integration between continental Europe and Scandinavia
Provide an alternative solution transport device crossing the Sound to be able to increase the efficiency of trade and business and leisure travel
Develop the Malmo-Copenhagen metropolitan area into one of the primary hubs in Europe
Offer a symbolic and impressive structure to the two nations
The overall objective, where the success of the project might be gauged, was, as stipulated in the treaty, to construct a Link that was 'ecologically motivate, officially possible and economically reasonable to avoid any detrimental results to the environment'.
The opportunity of the job would include:
Tender for the look of the Link
Construction of the Link
Construction and development of the encompassing areas
Unlike other mega-projects such as sites for the Olympic Game titles, the time was not especially brief for the Oresund hyperlink. The initiators evidently wished to keep it as brief as you can, to capitalize on the growing links in European countries and to supply the service to consumers as fast as possible. Additionally, by minimizing time, both states could try to reduce cost overrun. The initial span of time was place at a decade from the putting your signature on of the treaty in 1991 (Oresundsbro Konsortiet, 2009).
Quality was viewed as perhaps the most crucial parameter to be satisfied in the job, above cost and time. The consortium was charged with ensuring that the grade of the Link fulfilled all European safeness and structural standards (Eurocodes) (Kjaer, 2001). Furthermore it was stipulated that in terms of safety, The Link should be no more dangerous than using the countrywide roads or railroads (Kjaer, 2001). The Link also had to improve transport time over the Sound. A very important parameter established for the designers and constructors was to limit the environmental impact of the Link.
The budget for the development cost was establish at 13. 9billon DKK or 2. 4billion USD in 1990 prices (Kjaer, 2001). The consortium was priced with the financing, budgeting and planning. Because the Consortium was possessed by the Swedish and Danish government authorities the financial resources, within reason, were not as constraining one factor as the quality objective. Furthermore, the actual fact that job was financed beyond state budgets by the consortium meant it was not subject to constraints on tool allocation by the individual governments.
Design Selection of the Link
As we described in the precedent section, after the Swedish and Danish government setup a 50:50 jv resundsbro Konsortiet in 1992, the company then organized a design competition for the bridge in early 1993. The competition had taken over for 2 calendar months; the result came out in July that 12 months with two entirely different bridge principles chosen by the owner for further debate before the ultimate decision taken:
-Group ASO's two-level, mainly steel, composition, with the motorway put above the railway, ASO Group was initiated by Arup(specialized in structural engineering and who have completed the Sydney Opera House and the Pompidou Centre in Paris) and produced as well with SETEC (France), Gimsing & Madsen and ISC (both Denmark), Tyrns (Sweden), and with Georg Rotne (Denmark) as architect to the Group; - A single-level, mainly concrete, bridge, with the motorway between the two railway paths, produced by the LC consortium. They both possessed a cable-stayed main span.
Following the awards, concerning make an easier and wiser decision for the selection of designer, a continuous scheme designs were prepared to confirm the principles developed through the short competition period, along with the consultants caused the Owner to build up the project and get ready for the construction period.
Thus the further design process can be defined as:
- Consultations with authorities to acquire their approval
- set up a design basis and a agreement strategy
- create administrative procedures
- develop the design in a few detail
- prepare tender documents
Whereas it turned out that ASO's strong and sturdy design strategy was safely transported through this entire design process with only hardly any and insignificant adjustments. Sensitive documents were released for proposals from both semi-final winners- ASO and LC in Dec 1994, for two contracts for each: one for the procedure spans, and the other for the cable-stayed spans. The tenders were delivered in June 1995, and following the evaluation, the sole contract was agreed upon with Sundlink Companies in November 1995 for the whole of ASO Group's two-level design for the bridge.
The other two main agreements - one for Dredging and Reclamation and one for the Tunnel - had been let during the summer, and many coast-to-coast agreements were let during 1997-98 for the railway as well as for various installations such as SCADA / traffic control, marketing communications, toll system and the terminal area.
Design and Create Contract Strategy
The Owner got early made a decision to let the deals as design-and-construct deals, but modified so as to safeguard the conceptual designs that had been prepared. Essentially the agreements were for specific design and structure. As we have emphasized that such a Design & Building contract allowed staying away from any possible incompatibilities triggered by different custom made and constructor so that Owner were able to minimize the potential risks in this aspect.
According to the agreement documents, we can evidently identify the principles behind the Owner's contract strategy including:
A 100 years' service life
Program of well-known technology
Control and documentation of quality
Division of risks due to ground and climate and obtaining permits.
The deal documents were written expressly for the job, and identified the Owner's requirements regarding function, appearance, security, and environmental protection. Everything necessary to gratify those requirements was included in the Contractor's range of work, with only given duties on the dog owner. The Service provider was responsible for the precise design as well for the construction of the work, and was given considerable freedom about the means and methods of doing his work which is also a factor key for the success of this mega job.
In essence the dog owner specified what the Service provider should achieve, and the Company determined how to attain it. The Builder was responsible for supervising his own work as well as for providing documentary proof that he previously done so and this the grade of the work he previously done was of the typical required by the Agreement.
The Owner watched the Contractor's performance but this didn't relieve the Builder of his commitments under the agreement. This deal strategy resulted in several special documents being included in the tender documents released to the bidders, in particular meaning drawings, an illustrative design, guide conditions, and quality system requirements. The definition drawings described the design features, geometry, and materials that should be retained in the Contractor's design, and at the same time defined the limitations within which he previously the freedom to choose. The illustrative design proved the bidders, for information only, a comprehensive design that fulfilled the Owner's requirements.
So as to lessen the possible risks could ever take place during the building phase, the Owner assigned ASO as the developer of the Operational Risk Examination of the entire resund hyperlink. But since ASO itself was involved with it, the process would take advantage of the contribution of exterior reviewers, so Professor Tendrup Pedersen from the Danish Tech School was appointed to examine the marine aspects and Arup to review the remainder. So far as we know, it's the first time such a thorough risk analysis has been carried out through the design of a major fixed link.
A totally quantified risk assessment of the individuals basic safety and traffic hold off risks was carried out for a thorough list of dangers: fireplace explosion train collisions and derailments highway accidents ship collisions and groundings plane collisions dangerous spillages environmental tons beyond design basis.
Initially, the evaluation attempted exclusively to identity the potential risks beyond those of typical exercises of motorway and railway on mainland Denmark or Sweden. However, it soon became evident that this methodology could be improved by considering total dangers and being able to compare the Link's dangers with international risk approval criteria. We discovered that the risk assessment was carried out along with the design process and affected several design decisions, the most significant being the size of the bridge pier foundations to tolerate dispatch impact, the realignment of the primary shipping channel to reduce groundings, and the provision of passive fire coverage on the tunnel surfaces and ceilings.