Posted at 11.21.2018
The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare claims that a individuals well-being is the entire degree of desire-satisfaction in their life all together. The theory says us that your life goes well that you can the extent that you will get what you would like. Something is wonderful for you if, and only when, satisfies your needs (Shafer-Laudau, THE BASICS of Ethics, 39). In short, a lot more you get what you would like the better your life is, so when you dont than your life goes terribly because your dreams are frustrated. If we acknowledge this theory of welfare and value the welfare of others, then we'd try to satisfy other peoples needs, whatever they may be. Desire-satisfaction theory is egalitarian in a way that everyones desires are evenly important, and no desire is of more importance than another desire. It is because desire theory rejects all types of objective ideas on welfare. Objective ideas pertain that what plays a part in a good life is set individually of your desires and your judgment of what's important (Shafer-Laudau, THE BASICS of Ethics, 40). It takes into account peoples autonomy. It is important that for desire-satisfaction to be good, people must have freedom of preference and control over their lives. Of course there are situations where people desire the incorrect things or things that they might not normally desire. These so called problem dreams are brought on by insufficient information about their desire, logical errors in determining their desire, phony beliefs, and or desiring mutually impossible things. Regardless of whether a person desired the right things for the right reasons, there is still the objection of whether those needs are instrumentally pointless; such is the situation of the Grass Counter Objection.
"In a position of rational and enlightened choice, Cara, who's capable of a life of great fulfillment, camaraderie, love and pleasure, would desire most firmly a life of keeping track of blades of grass" (Crisp, 56).
In this objection, Cara is a rational and up to date person who is with the capacity of completing much in her life. Instead, Cara selects to count blades of lawn. This objection questions whether the desire-satisfaction theory is incorrect for saying that everyones dreams are equal, because a life of keeping track of lawn cannot compare to a life with love and pleasure. In addition, it questions if getting your preferences actually helps bring about your well-being. Regarding Cara, she desires counting cutting blades of lawn, even though she has great potential to further her life and acquire more joy if she did not solely desire counting grass. Common sense tells most individuals who Cara is really throwing away her life. It may appear that Caras need to count turf is pointless and doesnt make her life much better. Even when Cara sees great pleasure in counting lawn, it cannot possibly compare to the bigger pleasures such as love and friendship. Furthermore, by not seeking these higher sources of pleasure, which would promote more joy, Caras decision to count up grass is inappropriate, such that rewarding her desires cannot be the morally right action for her well-being. This objection can further conclude that not all desire are equivalent and some desires, even if they're rational and prepared ones and does indeed no injury to the person desiring it, it might be pointless. This objection may seem to be to establish that desire satisfaction is incorrect about well-being, that the best life is not just one which one needs. Although I'd buy into the objectors that love and friendship is more valuable than keeping track of grass, I really do not believe it is bad or pointless for Caras well-being to desire keeping track of blades of turf. In fact, In my opinion it's the action right on her behalf.
A desire might affect us as defective not because we desire it for the incorrect reasons, but because the desire may seem pointless. An afternoon spent counting grass might seem to be tranquil, but a whole life spent keeping track of grass may seem to be pathetic. But desire-satisfaction theory will approve of lives spent doing the most pointless things, so long as the person is constantly on the desire to be doing those pointless things. Under the condition that we know Cara is a up to date and a rational individual, who is not suffering from some form of neurosis from counting turf, and her need to count grass is bringing her more pleasure than pain, then we can safely and securely assume that keeping track of lawn is bettering Caras well-being. Desire theory will not put intrinsic value on pleasure, such that everyones desires are of identical importance. Therefore, Caras need to count lawn, even at the cost of not furthering pursuing higher degrees of pleasure, can make her happiest, and to assume otherwise would be bias on the objectors part. It really is bias of the objection to expect that counting lawn is less worthy when compared to a life with love and friendship. Even if we're able to empirically confirm that love and friendships are usually more valuable than counting lawn, if Cara doesnt desire might be found than it probably will not be bettering her well-being. It is because she cannot truly appreciate the great things about these so call higher appreciated desires if she will not desire them. For your person to accrue well-being from a desire, that person must actually have such desires. Image a college student whose really wants to become an artist, even at the price of knowing that her life may possibly be much more financially stable if she chose to pursue jobs such as doctor or engineer. Now image if her parents finally persuaded her to become doctor. She becomes a doctor, will save many lives which is well reputed. But because she never wanted to become a doctor, but was persuaded by guilt and responsibility by her parents, she cannot possible appreciate all pleasures she's obtain from being a doctor. There is going to be the strong lingering yearning for seeking an artistic job. This example implies that a more nice life is not necessarily better for those who live it (Shafer-Laudau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 43). In this example it is err on the parents part for forcing their personal wishes onto their childs without taking into consideration the personal aspect of desires. Desire-satisfaction areas that people desire whatever bring us delight, in a way that everything we desire is either the means or the ends to a means to joy. So if we dont desire might be found like becoming a doctor, even in the event it brings much good to the earth, our contentment and well-being would actually be stunted. Furthermore, to declare that one thing is more valuable to some other would total an objective list theory with probably some sort of desire-satisfaction platform. In the case, where that university student truly did desire being truly a doctor but presently did not desire it, becoming a doctor would not profit her either. In Caras circumstance, any theory which cases that her selection of counting grass is of reduced value than other pleasures, is sanitizing Caras wants, not for her own gain, but of issue predicated on objectors personal wants.
An objection against my debate may include that counting grass can be an activity that is unworthy of desiring not only because it is pointless, but because it lacks superiority and any dignified individual would not follow the pointless dreams over the wonderful. I think this discussion fails because the objector is calculating a subjects well-being by the quantity of excellent needs that is pursued and completed. This form of dimension is flawed because it will not value a things autonomy of not seeking excellent desires. Never to value a subject matter autonomy will put that subject matter welfare in peril. The objectors dimension based on a desires quality should not be mixed up by the way of measuring of welfare in a persons life. Caras grass keeping track of life may lack engagement in the excellent, but this does not indicate her well-being is destruction because of its lack in superiority. In the case of the college student who wanted to pursue art but finished up becoming a doctor, who's to say that being a doctor is more deserving than as an artist just because the profession is more excellent? To prospects whose view of brilliance is that of conserving lives, than being truly a doctor is more preferred, but for those who view imagination and imagination as more excellent, than an designer life would be the desired choice. The quality of an desire is put through individuals opinions, such that the most pointless desire to one person might be the most thrilling desire to another. Desire theorist avoid such problems about the value of an pleasure because they understand that a good life includes many things, in a way that everyone desires are unique to them. Furthermore, chances are that we could harm Cara, if we diminish her well-being, by specifically refusing to let her follow her hearts desire, regardless of the lack of excellence of the experience. So my reply is that desires may be considered pointless if there were a common way of measuring the excellence of this activity, but in no way are there pointless wishes on the welfare scale predicated on desire-satisfaction.