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The Record Of International Cybersecurity Politics Essay

The USA, Britain, and Continental Europe have very different methods to cybersecurity. The United States and United Kingdom conceive of cyber generally as a nationwide security problem to be handled by the government- which in turn sees the web as a fifth area of warfare to be dominated. All of those other EU, however, considers cyber threats usually as an irritant for business and individual level of privacy that needs to be dealt with by civilian authorities working in combination with private venture.

Additionally, while the USA can have an individual policy, even though its one applied by many different national departments, the European Union is made up of twenty-seven nations with their own laws and regulations, notions, and philosophical differences over how to overcome cyber issues. Finally, there is NATO, in which a unified transatlantic cyber eyesight must be reconciled and assemble in a coherent manner among twenty-eight allies by way of a cumbersome bureaucratic process. To make sense of the conflicting visions, this essay reviews cyber problems against NATO participants, attempts to format the difficulties of creating a transatlantic perspective for cyber insurance plan, and highlights some of the fundamental dissimilarities among NATO people.

It is effective to remember that although the Internet is so ensconced in most of our lives that it is hard to envision living without it, the first modern Web browser didn't debut until 1993 and broadband gain access to has only become popular over the last decade. Because of this, senior federal and military market leaders did not expand up with the Internet and are gradually having to adjust to rising cyber realities. Franklin Kramer, who worked as helper secretary of security under President Expenses Clinton, draws an evaluation with the fantastic Flames of London, he notes that it practically destroyed metropolis in 1666 "because an advance in living conditions- solid wood properties for many- had not been matched up by security actions. There were no firefighting technologies, no firefighting processes, and no resources devoted to fire fighting with each other. " This was still true more than two decades later with the Great Chicago Fire. Despite our slow learning curve, "in the modern world, while flames may strike, it is not the city-devouring scourge that this was previously. " Through administration regulations that proven building rules and through volunteer and government-run flames departments, a protective-response was founded over the decades.

Former Deputy Secretary of Protection William J. Lynn III uses a more extreme analogy: "The first armed service aircraft was bought, I believe, in 1908, around there. So we're in about 1928, " he said. "We've kind of seen some biplanes throw at the other person over France, " he added. "But we haven't really seen kind of what a true cyberconflict is going to appear to be. "

Currently, Western european policymakers seem to take care of cybersecurity more along fire-prevention lines rather than as biplanes over France. And framing is crucial when thinking about cyber issues. As Kramer observes, "Ask the incorrect question, and you simply generally are certain to get the incorrect answer. And cyber- and how to proceed about cyber conflict- can be an industry where there is generally no contract on what's the question, certainly no agreement on what are the answers, and developing so fast that questions are transmuted and affect and change the validity of answers which may have been given. " He argues that having less agreement over the nature of the problem, insufficient coherent regulation and expert mechanisms, and turmoil between connectivity and security together make cyber a "wicked problem" not easily vunerable to resolution.

Lynn manages to frame the issue in military and security terms but completely acknowledges that the reality is quite blurred which no clear lines are present in this new site. "I mean, clearly invest the down significant servings of our current economic climate we would probably consider that an assault. But an intrusion stealing data, on the other side, probably isn't an assault. And there are [an] enormous amount of steps among those two. "

Lynn goes on to state, one of the challenges facing Pentagon strategists is "deciding at what threshold do you consider something an harm I believe the policy community both outside and inside the government is wrestling with that, and I don't believe we've wrestled it to the bottom yet. " In other words, it is difficult to know whether the house is burning or biplanes are firing at one another.

Correspondingly tricky, protection representatives say, is how to identify who is doing the attacking. This increases further issues that are plainly at the heart of the Pentagon's mission. In the Council on Foreign Relationships Lynn summarized the problem "If you don't know who to feature an invasion to, you can't retaliate against that strike, " Because of this, "you can't deter through abuse, you can't deter by retaliating against the harm. " He talked about the complexities that produce cyberwar so different from, say, "nuclear missiles, which of course come with a go back address. "

The cyber menace is very much a part of our current truth. Over the last many years several NATO associates and partners, like the USA, have been targeted by severe cyber attacks.


What is commonly thought to be the "first known circumstance of one point out targeting another by cyber-warfare" commenced on Apr 27, 2007, whenever a massive denial-of-service episode premiered by Russia against Estonia over the dispute including a statue. The invasion crippled "websites of federal ministries, political get-togethers, newspapers, banking institutions, and companies. " The invasion was nicknamed Web War One and it caused a resonation within transatlantic nationwide security circles.

The German publication Deutsche Welle published that "Estonia is specially vulnerable to cyber attacks since it is one of the very most wired countries in the world. Everybody in Estonia conducts bank and other daily activities on line. So when the cyber assault occurred, it practically shut Estonia down. " Then-EU Information Population and Multimedia commissioner Viviane Reding called the episodes "a wakeup call, " commenting that "if people don't realize the urgency now, they never will. " Her reaction was to incorporate a response into an EU-wide law on identity robbery online. Additionally, NATO did set up a Cyber Center of Brilliance in Tallinn, which will be discussed later in the essay.


While not a NATO member, Georgia is a NATO spouse, and the April 2008 Bucharest Summit announced that it "will become a member" at some unspecified time in the future, a offer reiterated at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit. Weeks before the August 2008 Russian land invasion and air assault, Georgia was at the mercy of an extensive, coordinated cyber assault. American experts approximated that the "attacks against Georgia's Internet infrastructure started as soon as July 20, with coordinated barrages of millions of requests- known as sent out denial of service, or DDOS, episodes- that overloaded and effectively turn off Georgian servers. " The pressure was intensified through the early days of the conflict, effectively shutting down critical communications in Georgia.

After defacing Georgian Chief executive Mikheil Saakashvili's internet site and integrating a slideshow portraying Saakashvili as Hitler, coming up with similar images of both Saakashvili and Hitler's general public appearances, the site remained under a suffered DDoS attack. Writing as the attacks were under way, security expert Dancho Danchev believed it "has the aroma of a three letter brains agency's propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply the creative for the defacement of Georgia President's official web site, in doing so forgetting a simple rule of proposal in that conflict- risk forwarding the duty of the invasion to each and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked Georgian sites using publicly accessible DDOS assault tools in a coordinated fashion. " Costs Woodcock, the research director at Packet Clearing House, a California-based nonprofit group that monitors Internet security fads, mentioned that the episodes displayed a landmark: the first use of an cyber attack in conjunction with an armed military invasion.

The mother nature of cyber problems is in a way that, two and a half years later, there continues to be no definitive answer on who caused the attack. They certainly emanated from Russia, but the specific role of Moscow's government and intellect services remains unclear. Given that the cyber attacks preceded and supported conventional military disorders, there appears to be a web link to the Russian federal. A March 2009 statement by Greylogic "concluded Russia's Overseas Military Intelligence firm (the GRU) and Government Security Service (the FSB), somewhat than patriotic hackers, were more likely to have played a key role in coordinating and arranging the problems. " They added, "The available research supports a solid probability of GRU/ FSB planning and path at a high level while counting on Nashi intermediaries and the happening of crowd-sourcing to obfuscate their engagement and put into practice their strategy. "

United States

In a 2010 essay for Foreign Affairs, Lynn discovered that

in 2008, the US Department of Defense suffered a substantial bargain of its categorised military computer sites. It started when an contaminated adobe flash drive was inserted into a All of us military services laptop at a base in the Middle East. The adobe flash drive's harmful computer code, positioned there by a foreign intelligence firm, submitted itself onto a network run by the US Central Command word. That code pass on undetected on both labeled and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to an electronic beachhead, from which data could be used in servers under overseas control.

The upshot is that "adversaries have obtained thousands of data from US systems and from the networks of US allies and industry associates, including weapons blueprints, operational programs, and monitoring data. "

Lynn categorized this invasion as "the most significant breach folks military computers ever" and mentioned which it "served as an important wake-up call. " He recognized that "compared to that point, we did not think our classified systems could be penetrated. " The consequence of this new recognition was Operation Buckshot Yankee, a fourteen-month program that rid US systems of the agent. btz worm and "helped business lead to a significant reorganization of the equipped makes' information defenses, like the creation of the military's new Cyber Order. "

United Kingdom

In a speech at the 2011 Munich Security Convention, British foreign secretary William Hague unveiled that a group of cyber disorders on his country took place the previous calendar year. He known that "in later Dec a spoofed email purporting to be from the White House was sent to a large range of international recipients who have been directed to select a link that then downloaded a version of ZEUS. THE UNITED KINGDOM Federal government was targeted in this attack and a sizable number of emails bypassed a few of our filter systems. "

Additionally, sometime this year 2010 "the national security interests of the united kingdom were targeted in a deliberate harm on our security industry. A harmful document posing as a report on a nuclear Trident missile was delivered to a defense builder by someone masquerading as an employee of another protection contractor. Good protecting security recommended that the email was found and blocked, but its goal was doubtlessly to take information relating to our most very sensitive defense assignments. "

Finally, in February 2011, "three of my staff were sent an email, apparently from a English colleague outside the FCO, working on their region. The email stated to be about a forthcoming stop by at the region and appeared quite innocent. In fact it was from a hostile express intelligence agency and covered computer code inlayed in the attached document that could have attacked their machine. Thankfully, our systems recognized it and ceased it from ever before reaching my staff. " Still, the prevalence and sophistication of these episodes are a primary reason cybersecurity and cyber-crime were detailed as two of the very best five priorities in the UK's Country wide Security Strategy.

Given the interconnectivity of the Internet, Hague argued that more complete international collaboration is essential, noting that, while "cyber security is on the agendas of some 30 multilateral organizations, from the UN to the OSCE and the G8, " the challenge is the fact "much of this issue is fragmented and lacks concentrate. " He continued, "We believe there is a need for a far more comprehensive, organised dialogue to begin to generate consensus among like-minded countries also to lay the basis for contract on a set of standards about how countries should react on the net. "

US- Western european Attitudinal Differences

We start to have the ability to discern a pattern: The United States and the uk take cyber security very critically and view it generally through the zoom lens of countrywide security. The EU and most Western European customers of NATO see it mainly as a commercial infrastructure problem. Inside the run-up to the November 2010 Lisbon NATO Summit, Pentagon officials were pressing very firmly to incorporate a concept of "active cyber security" in to the revised NATO Strategic Theory. Lynn argued that "the Cold War ideas of shared warning apply in the 21st century to cyber security. Just like our air defenses, our missile defenses have been associated so too do our cyber defenses have to be linked as well. " However, this idea was firmly rejected by the Europeans, with the French particularly adamant.


A July 2010 Economist report proclaimed: "After land, sea, air and space, warfare has got into the fifth domains: cyberspace. " It observed that President Obama had declared the digital infrastructure a "strategic nationwide asset" and experienced appointed Howard Schmidt, the ex - head of security at Microsoft, as the first cybersecurity tsar. Peter Coates notes that the environment force had actually expected this move in Dec 2005, declaring cyber a fifth site when it evolved its mission assertion to "To travel and combat in air, space, and cyberspace. " In November of the next year, it redesignated the 8th Air Pressure to be Air Pressure Cyberspace Demand.

In May 2010 the Protection Department launched a fresh subunified command, United States Cyber Command word, with Gen. Keith Alexander dual-hatted as its key while continuing on as director of the Country wide Security Agency. CYBERCOM is priced with the responsibility to "direct the operations and protection of specified Team of Protection information networks and put together to, so when directed, conduct full spectrum military services cyberspace operations to be able to enable activities in all domains, ensure US/ Allied flexibility of action in cyberspace and deny the same to your adversaries. "

As the level of cyberwarfare's risk to US national security and the united states economy has enter into view, the Pentagon has built layered and solid defenses around military services systems and inaugurated the new US Cyber Control to integrate cyber-defense operations over the government. The Pentagon is currently dealing with the Department of Homeland Security to protect government networks and critical infrastructure and with the United States' closest allies to increase these defenses internationally. An enormous amount of foundational work remains, however the US federal government has begun investing in place various initiatives to defend the United States in the digital age group. Despite having stepped-up vigilance and resources, Lynn admits, "adversaries have received thousands of files from US sites and from the systems folks allies and industry partners, including weapons plans, operational strategies, and security data. "

The cyber policy of the United States is rapidly innovating, with major developments under way even while I write this essay. The White House given a fresh International Technique for Cyberspace in-may 2011. Without at all leaving a defense-oriented posture- indeed, it produced breathless commentary by declaring the to meet cyber disorders with a kinetic response- it wanted to bring commercial, specific, diplomatic, and other pursuits into the equation. This was followed by a new Department of Security cyber strategy in July 2011, which built on Lynn's Foreign Affairs article.

European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)

While CYBERCOM is the most powerful and well-funded US cyber firm, the lead European union cyber agency is ENISA, the Western european Network and Information Security Company. Whereas CYBERCOM is run by a general with an intellect background, ENISA is run by way of a physics professor with long experience in the IT sector, including the "energy industry, insurance company engineering, aviation, security, and space industry. " The agency's quest is to "create a culture of Network and Information Security for the benefit for residents, consumers, business and general population sector organizations in europe. "

In December 2010 ENISA released a report determining what it perceives as the top security hazards and opportunities of smartphone use and provides security advice for businesses, consumers and government authorities. The company considers spyware, poor data cleaning when recycling phones, accidental data leakage, and unauthorized premium-rate phone calls and SMSs as the very best risks. New legislation are proposed that could start to see the perpetrators of cyber disorders and the companies of related and destructive software prosecuted, and unlawful sanctions increased to a maximum two-year word. European countries would also need to answer quickly to demands for help when cyber disorders are perpetrated, and new pan-European unlawful offences will be designed for the "unlawful interception of information systems. " Home affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstr¶m added that criminalizing the creation and selling of destructive software and enhancing European police cooperation would help European countries "intensify our attempts against cybercrime. "

ENISA's new mandate will let the agency coordinate pan-European cybersecurity exercises, general public- private network resilience partnerships, and risk evaluation and awareness promotions. ENISA's funding will also be boosted, and its management board will receive a "stronger supervisory role. " ENISA's mandate is also to be long by five years to 2017. The brand new directive will also supersede a 2005 council platform decision on cybercrime because that past regulation didn't concentrate sufficiently on changing threats- specifically, large-scale simultaneous attacks against information systems, such as Stuxnet, and the increasing legal use of botnets. Stuxnet was just lately used to strike Iran's nuclear ability infrastructure, and a single botnet, Rustock, is predicted to be accountable for two-fifths of the world's spam.

Additionally, EU states are constrained by Directive 95/ 46/ EC, better known as the info Protection Directive, which gives enormous safeguard for "any information relating to an determined or identifiable natural person. " Compare this to the USA Patriot Act, which gives tremendous leeway to US police and intelligence organizations to access electronic data placed by US companies to be able to research and deter terrorist activities. In June 2011 Gordon Frazer, handling director of Microsoft UK, tripped a firestorm when he announced that Western european customer data stored on cloud processing services by companies with a US existence cannot be guaranteed the protections afforded under the info Protection Directive, leaving a demand from some European union lawmakers to resolve this problem.


In late February 2011 Germany's outgoing minister of the interior, Thomas de MaiziЁre, launched the country's Nationale Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie (National Cyber Security Strategy). To American eyes, the actual fact that it was the interior ministry, not the protection ministry, issuing the strategy is striking. It had been no crash: this is in no way a defense record.

The document's introduction notes that "in Germany all players of social and financial life use the options provided by cyberspace. As part of an extremely interconnected world, the state, critical infrastructures, businesses and people in Germany rely upon the reliable functioning of information and communication technology and the web. " One of the threats listed: "Malfunctioning IT products and components, the break-down of information infrastructures or serious cyber episodes may have a considerable negative effect on the performance of technology, businesses and the administration and therefore on Germany's communal lifelines. " Contrast this with Lynn's analogy of biplanes over France, and his pondering "at what threshold do you take into account something an assault?"

German security scholar Thomas Rid laments that the strategy is "approaching a bit past due" and that Germany's thinking lags that of america and the United Kingdom. Beyond that, he notes that both agencies created to take care of cyber issues are woefully understaffed and tasked with myriad tasks related tangentially at best to cyber security. And, corresponding to a cyber "kodex" established in the new strategy, "German interests in data security would be pursued in international organizations like the UN, the OSCE, the Western european Council, the OECD, and NATO- for the reason that order. "

United Kingdom as Outlier

As is generally the situation on matters of international security, the uk is much more in line with its American cousin than its neighbours on the Continent. In an Oct 12, 2010, speech at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iain Lobban, director of GCHQ (the UK's National Security Organization analogue, responsible for signals intellect) noted that his country combines the cleverness and information assurance missions in a single agency, an design "shared by just a few other countries, most notably the US. It offers us a richer view of vulnerabilities and risks than those who consider them purely from the idea of view of defense. "

He confessed to frequent barrages of spam, worms, "theft of intellectual property on a massive scale, a few of it not only delicate to the commercial enterprises involved but of countrywide security concern too, " and everything types of other attacks which have brought on "significant disruption to Administration systems. " Consequently, his government was seeking to significantly increase its investment in the cyber realm even at the same time when the global recession was forcing significant austerity in other departments, including in more traditional military assets.

Thomas Rid notes the large breadth of Lobban's emphasis: "Cyber includes, for instance, increasingly more online administration services (read: gradually increasing vulnerability); critical national infrastructure, publicly or privately run; online criminal offense in every its facets; espionage (both professional and governmental), and such things as the "proper norms of patterns for responsible expresses. "

The implications are huge, as Lobban suggestions and Rid explicates: "partnerships of a fresh kind are had a need to offer with cyber hazards and dangers. International partnerships, with like-minded countries that need to establish and maintain appropriate norms of habit in crisis situations- and intersectoral partnerships, between authorities agencies and industry, especially the high-tech sector. "

In his Munich Security Convention speech, Hague mentioned that "we count on computer sites for this inflatable water inside our taps, the electricity inside our kitchens, the 'sat navs' in our cars, the jogging of trains, the storing of your medical documents, the option of food in our supermarkets and the circulation of money into traditional cash machines. " Further, "Many administration services are actually shipped via the internet, as is education in many classrooms. In the united kingdom, 70 percent of younger internet users loan provider online and two thirds of all adults shop on the internet. "

Given the new knowing of vulnerabilities and the amount of dependence, then, the United Kingdom's new National Security Strategy "ranks cyber strike and cyber criminal offense inside our top five highest main concern risks. " This isn't lip service. At the same time that the British military is suffering such severe cutbacks that the Royal Navy is reduced to posting a single aeroplanes carrier with France, the current budget "provided 650 million of new funding for a nationwide cyber-security program, which will improve our features in cyber-space and draw together government efforts. " Within that work, Hague said, "We've established a new Ministerial Group on cyber security that i chair. And we have boosted the UK's cyber functions with the establishment of a new Defense Cyber Procedures Group, combining cyber security in to the mainstream in our protection planning and procedure. "

NATO Responses

After a few months of review and question the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon given a new tactical principle on November 19, 2010. In it, cyber issues were officially identified for the very first time as a core alliance quest. Knowing that "cyber attacks have become more recurrent, more arranged and more costly in the destruction that they inflict, " NATO pledged to "develop further our capability to prevent, identify, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including utilizing the NATO planning process to improve and coordinate countrywide cyber-defense capabilities, having all NATO bodies under centralized cyber cover, and better integrating NATO cyber recognition, caution and response with member countries. "

This was implemented in June 2011 by the revised NATO insurance plan on cyber security and a parallel cyber security action plan. Merged, they "provide a coordinated approach to cyber defense across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber hazards and building resilience. " Additionally, "all NATO constructions will be helped bring under centralized safety. "

What practical activities will stream from these plan statements remains unclear, especially within an period of radically declining costs. However they give a synopsis of what it conditions "NATO's theory cyber security activities. "

Coordinating and Advising on Cyber Defense

The cyber-defense plan was implemented by NATO's political, military, and technical specialists, as well as by individual allies. A main aspect of the insurance policy was the establishment of a NATO Cyber Defence Management Power (CDMA) which has the sole responsibility of coordinating cyber protection throughout the Alliance. The NATO CDMA is supervised by the Cyber Defence Management Board, which includes the leaders of the political, military, functional, and specialized staffs in NATO with obligations for cyber protection. It constitutes the primary appointment body for the North Atlantic Council on cyber protection. NATO CDMA happens to be working under the auspices of the Emerging Security Troubles Department (i. e. , chairmanship and its Cyber Defence Coordination and Support Centre) in NATO headquarters and advice to member areas on all main areas of cyber defense.

Assisting Individual Allies

Prior to the cyber problems on Estonia in 2007, NATO's cyber-defense attempts were principally concentrated on guarding the communication systems owned and controlled by the Alliance. Due to the attacks, that have been targeted against general public services and carried out across the Internet, NATO's concentrate has been widened to include the cybersecurity of individual allies. This implies that NATO is rolling out mechanisms for assisting those allies who seek NATO support for the security of their communication systems, including through the dispatch of Super fast Reinforcement Clubs. However, the allied NATO countries continue being primarily responsible for the security and safety of their own communication systems.

Cooperating with Partners

NATO is expanding practical cooperation on cyber protection relative to the Council Guidelines for Assistance on Cyber Defence with Associates and International Organisations (approved in August 2008), and the Framework for Co-operation on Cyber Defence between NATO and Spouse countries (approved in April 2009). Records from the 2010 Lisbon Nato summit state that in line with existing plan, NATO is well prepared, without minimizing its ability to guard itself, to extend to partner countries and international organizations its experience and, possibly, its capabilities to defend against cyber disorders. However, collaboration on cyber security should be considered a two-way avenue: NATO also needs to profit from consultations and exchanges with other celebrities and should be able to obtain assistance in case of need. By making use of existing assistance tools, NATO may tailor support to the needs and hobbies of individual companions or international organizations, and may match said support it with available resources.


It will likely be years prior to the functional issues of implementation are sorted out through the NATO bureaucracy. Again, america and the uk will be the most aggressive members pushing for the issue to be handled through military channels in NATO. Most of the others see little for the alliance to do here, seeing it predominately as a civil subject. One mechanism by which NATO has been checking out the issue is through the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Brilliance in Tallinn, Estonia. It had been established in May 2008 in the wake of the cyber problems on Estonia, talked about before in the article.

Ilmar Tamm, the center's director, explains that "our definitive goal here is to perform post-incident analysis and research trying to identify what was the primary cause, what was the actual motivation and what could be the potential dangers and trends for future years. " He notes, however, that "the center is not an operational center. So we aren't here 24 hours a day 7 days per week monitoring the sites and doing network security consequently. " Therefore, "incident handling and such type of operations remain carried out by national companies, by certain NATO corporations if NATO networks are involved and undoubtedly the private sector does their own focus on their networks. "

It is significant, too, that the center's team does not include reps from three of NATO's more powerful members- the United States, UK, or France- but currently includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Slovak Republic, and Spain as sponsoring nations. By March 2011, productive attempts were under way to resolve this matter. Lynn was regularly ending up in key European leaders, including NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to discuss "ways to bolster cybersecurity and also to continue on the Lisbon Summit declaration to build up and execute a NATO cyber insurance policy and implementation plan with real capacities. " The target was clear: "bringing these nations jointly under this NATO common eyesight and having them leverage each others' skills and experiences and drawing one common vision based on the threat to better secure NATO's systems. "

At the same time, US representatives are clearly frustrated with the poor pace of movement on the issue. "I think the discourse for NATO at this point, the threshold step is we have to be able to protect our own military networks, and frankly we're not there yet, " Lynn informed journalists after meetings with European Union and NATO representatives as well as the private sector. Thomas Rid offers a pessimistic role for the prospects of that changing any time soon: "Don't wager on NATO. " He argues that "some in the Alliance appear to see cyberspace as a life-saving opportunity. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Alliance's secretary standard, apparently pushes the envelope on cyber-defense within the Atlantic Alliance. " But Rid contends that competition, secrecy, budget constraints, and other factors could keep it from congealing.

Predicting the future is beyond the scope of this article and beyond my capability. But, when there is to be important transatlantic cooperation on cyber security- and there simply must be- NATO is the only game around. Not only has it been the leading transatlantic establishment of the postwar period but it's the only venue where in fact the USA and United Kingdom, who'll dominate the problem through sheer dedication to it and who see it through a military lens, can commonly achieve wider consensus.

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