Posted at 12.18.2018
The open characteristics of the cellular medium leaves it susceptible to intentional interference problems, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional disturbance with wireless transmissions can be utilized as a launchpad for mounting Denial-of-Service episodes on wireless networks. Typically, jamming has been resolved under an external threat model. However, adversaries with inner knowledge of protocol technical specs and network secrets can start low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. Within this work, we address the condition of selective jamming attacks in wireless systems. In these problems, the adversary is dynamic only for a brief period of the time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the features of selective jamming in conditions of network performance degradation and adversary work by delivering two circumstance studies; a selective assault on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched by carrying out real-time packet classification at the physical covering. To mitigate these disorders, we develop three strategies that prevent real-time packet classification by merging cryptographic primitives with physical-layer qualities. We review the security of our methods and assess their computational and communication over head.
1. Symmetric encryption algorithm
2. Brute power attacks against stop encryption algorithms
We propose a remedy predicated on All-Or- Little or nothing Transformations (AONT) that presents a humble communication and computation over head. Such transformations were formerly suggested by Rivest to decelerate brute force episodes against block encryption algorithms. An AONT acts as a publicly known and completely invertible pre-processing step to a plaintext before it is passed to an ordinary stop encryption algorithm.
Jamming episodes are much harder to counter plus more security problems. They have got been shown to actualize severe Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against wireless systems. In the easiest form of jamming, the adversary inhibits the reception of communications by transmitting a continuing jamming signal, or several short jamming pulses jamming episodes have been considered under an external threat model, in which the jammer is not area of the network. Under this model, jamming strategies are the continuous or arbitrary transmitting of highpower interference signals
In this newspaper, we address the condition of jamming under an internal hazard model. We consider a sophisticated adversary who's aware of network secrets and the execution details of network protocols at any covering in the network stack. The adversary exploits his inside knowledge for releasing selective jamming episodes where specific communications of "high importance" are targeted. For example, a jammer can target route-request/route-reply text messages at the routing level to prevent route discovery, or target TCP acknowledgments in a TCP time to greatly degrade the throughput of any end-to-end flow
To launch selective jamming episodes, the adversary must be capable of implementing a "classify-then-jam" strategy before the completion of a wireless transmission. Such strategy can be actualized either by classifying transmitted packets using process semantics, or by decoding
packets on the fly. In the last mentioned method, the jammer may decode the first few bits of a packet for recovering useful packet identifiers such as packet type, source and vacation spot address. After classification, the adversary must cause a sufficient number of bit errors so the packet cannot be retrieved at the receiver . Selective jamming requires a romantic knowledge of the physical (PHY) covering, as well by the details of top layers
1. Network module
2. Real Time Packet Classification
3. Selective Jamming Module
4. Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (SHCS)
5. Cryptographic Puzzle Concealing Scheme (CPHS)
We address the situation of stopping the jamming node from classifying m in real time, thus mitigating J's capability to perform selective jamming.
The network contains a assortment of nodes linked via cordless links. Nodes may converse directly if they're within communication range, or indirectly via multiple hops. Nodes connect both in unicast function and broadcast setting. Communications can be either unencrypted or encrypted. For encrypted broadcast marketing communications, symmetric keys are distributed among all meant receivers. These tips are founded using preshared pairwise secrets or asymmetric cryptography.
Consider the universal communication system depicted in Fig. In the PHY level, a packet m is encoded, interleaved, and modulated before it is sent over the cordless channel. At the receiver, the signal is demodulated, deinterleaved, and decoded, to recover the initial packet m.
Moreover, even if the encryption key of any hiding plan were to stay hidden knowledge, the static portions of a sent packet could potentially lead to packet classification. This is because for computationally-efficient encryption methods such as stop encryption, the encryption of a prefix plaintext with the same key yields a static ciphertext prefix. Hence, an adversary who is alert to the underlying standard protocol specifics (structure of the body) may use the static ciphertext helpings of a sent packet to classify it.
3. Selective Jamming Module
We demonstrate the impact of selective jamming disorders on the network performance. put into action selective jamming episodes in two multi-hop cellular network scenarios. Inside the first situation, the attacker targeted a TCP connection established over a multi-hop wireless path. In the next situation, the jammer targeted network-layer control information transmitted through the path establishment process
selective jamming would be the encryption of transmitted packets (including headers) with a static key. However, for broadcast communications, this static decryption key must be recognized to all meant receivers and therefore, is vunerable to bargain. An adversary in possession of the decryption key can start decrypting as soon as the reception of the first ciphertext block.
4. Strong Concealing Commitment Structure (SHCS)
We propose a strong hiding commitment plan (SHCS), which is based on symmetric cryptography. Our main determination is to satisfy the strong hiding property while keeping the computation and communication overhead to the very least.
The computation overhead of SHCS is one symmetric encryption at the sender and one symmetric decryption at the device. Because the header
information is permuted as a trailer and encrypted, all receivers near a sender must receive the entire packet and decrypt it, prior to the packet type and vacation spot can be identified. However, in cellular protocols such as 802. 11, the complete packet is received at the MAC coating before it is decided if the packet must be discarded or be further refined. If some parts of the Mac pc header are deemed not to be useful information to the jammer, they can stay unencrypted in the header of the packet, thus\ preventing the decryption procedure at the receiver.
5. Cryptographic Puzzle Concealing Scheme (CPHS)
we present a packet covering scheme predicated on cryptographic puzzles. The main idea behind such puzzles is to push the recipient of a puzzle execute a pre-defined set of computations before the guy can extract a key of interest. The time required for obtaining the solution of a puzzle is determined by its hardness and the computational ability of the solver. The good thing about the puzzlebased program is that its security does not count on the PHY part parameters. However, it offers higher computation and communication overhead
We consider several puzzle strategies as the foundation for CPHS. For every scheme, we assess the execution details which impact security and performance. Cryptographic puzzles are primitives originally suggested by Merkle as a way for establishing a technique over an insecure channel. They find a variety of applications from preventing DoS attacks to providing broadcast authentication and key escrow schemes