A good solution comes from the disagreement of bad luck. (Benn, 1967) Here, the
morally relevant variation between animals and humans is the counter-factual quality of
misfortune. This suggested quality of misfortune communicates the meaning significance about what could have
been the case rather than what is the case. Instead of focusing on a human's potential to develop
enhanced moral capabilities in the foreseeable future, this disagreement focuses on what a human could have
probably developed if they had not endured a misfortune.
According for this argument, the key reason why we would experiment on a usual dog rather than a
cognitively disabled individual is that although the human has suffered a bad luck, the dog hasn't.
(Kaufman, 1998, g. 155) Like a person is the norm for any human being. In the event the human hadn't suffered
the bad luck of having a severe human brain impairment, he would have developed each of the cognitive
capacities needed to obtain the meaning significance of a person. In comparison, the dog has not suffered
a misfortune since it can be regular for his species to acquire limited intellectual capacities. Therefore, we
should choose to experiment in animals since this will not be taking advantage of a bad luck whereas
experimenting about cognitively-disabled human beings will be.
This argument allows us to overcome the barrier of making use of actual cognitive capacities and grants
the hobbies of cognitively-disabled humans' higher moral value than pets or animals for
experimentation. Therefore we could subject to Singer's claim by citing meaningful cognitive capabilities
and the morally-relevant component of bad luck to allow equally cognitively-abled and cognitively-
incapable humans into our principle of equal rights but not family pets.
One counter-argument Singer give...
... involving the cognitively-disabled human beings and the pets or animals.
In conclusion, I've demonstrated that Vocalist is right in claiming all of us cannot morally treat
comparable interests from animals and humans as different. We cannot work with actual capabilities to find
a morally-relevant element which grants humans increased moral thought than individuals
(beyond staying sentient) since this always causes the exemption of brain-damaged humans.
Using the even more promising counter-factual quality of misfortune does not overcome this
unsavoury implication mainly because it also offers an unclear variation between pets and cognitively-
disabled humans. This means Musician is right in saying we should either acknowledge animals in the
rule of similar consideration of interests, or perhaps allow cognitively-disabled individuals to endure the
same burden as family pets in being used for painful tests.